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FIRST AMENDMENT PROSPECTIVE
THE GAG RULE AND FREE SPEECH
Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer,
371 F.Supp. 689 (N.D. Ill. 1974).
Freedom of speech and of the press are fundamental liberties guar-
anteed by the Constitution. They must be zealously preserved, but
at the same time must be exercised with an awareness of the poten-
tial impact of public statements on other fundamental rights, in-
cluding the right of a person accused of crime, and of his accusers,
to a fair trial by an impartial jury.'
The above statement frames the difficult problem of striking the proper
balance between the 'guarantees of free speech of the first amendment and
of a fair trial of the sixth amendment. The American Bar Association and
the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois at-
tempted to harmonize these guarantees when, in 1971, they adopted rules
which prohibit judicial personnel from making extra-judicial statements
which are reasonably likely to interfere with a fair trial or to otherwise preju-
dice the due administration of justice. 2 These rules, referred to as the no-
comment or gag rules, establish the proposition that the freedoms of the first
amendment must be subordinate to the rights of the sixth whenever exercise
of the first is reasonably likely to interfere with the guarantees of the sixth.
3
The constitutionality of the gag rules has recently been upheld in Chi-
cago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer.4 The decision has been appealed to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.5 This note will
analyze the reasoning of the district court in determining the constitution-
ality of the gag rules and their limit on free speech, assess the soundness of
the court's decision to narrow the old standard defining the limits of free
speech, and point out the alternatives available to the Seventh Circuit on ap-
pellate review.
Chicago Council of Lawyers
v. Bauer
In Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer,6 an association of local lawyers
1. ADVIsORY COMMITTEE ON FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS, A.B.A. PRojEcT ON
MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO FAIR TRIAL AND
FREE PRESS, 16 (1968).
2. Loc. CRIM. RULE 1.07 and ABA DISCIPLINARY RULES No. 7-107.
3. Id.
4. 371 F. Supp. 689 (N.D. Ill. 1974).
5. Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, No. 74 C 1305 (7th Cir., filed 1974).
6. Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 371 F. Supp. 689 (N.D. Ill. 1974)
(hereinafter referred to as Chicago Council of Lawyes).
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and seven of its attorney members brought an action for declaratory judg-
ment and injunctive relief. They sought a finding that Local Criminal ,Rule
1.07 for the Northern District of Illinois and Disciplinary Rule 7-107 of the
American Bar Association Code of Professional Responsibility were uncon-
stitutional on their face because they were violative of rghts under the first
amendment.7 These gag rules prohibit counsel from releasing any extra-ju-
dicial statement (informational or opinionated) in connection with imminent
or pending litigation s where "there is a reasonable likelihood that such dis-
semination will interfere with a fair trial or otherwise prejudice the due ad-
ministration of justice."9
It should be noted that the attack in Chicago Council of Lawyers was
made only by defense lawyers, and not prosecutors or law enforcement offi-
cials. 10 There are inherent differences in interests and types of statements
which may be made by defense counsels. Whereas a prosecutor may release
information about a defendant's past criminal record, a defense attorney is
more likely to comment on the attitude or techniques of police investigation,
merits of the case or judicial temperament." It is unclear whether the dis-
trict court's opinion reflects this distinction and no intimation is made here
as to the constitutionality of the rules, or its standard of measurement, when
applied to court personnel other than defense counsel.
The Chicago Council of Lawyers had contended that the gag rules
were unconstitutionally overbroad,12 because they exceeded the minimum re-
straints necessary to assure a fair and impartial trial.' 3  The court, noting
that it is fundamental to our system of justice that decisions be induced only
by evidence and argument in open court and not by any outside influence,' 4
pointed out that the right to a fair trial extends not only to defendants but
7. Id. at 690. Plaintiffs had alleged, and the court had assumed "arguendo", that
local Rule 8 and the Nov., 1965 Policy Statement issued by the judges of the Federal
Courts for the N.D. of Ill. were intended to incorporate the ABA DISCIPLNARY RULES.
8. Loc. Rule 1.07 applies only to criminal litigation. But ABA DR7-107 ex-
tends this to include civil cases as well.
9. Loc. CRIM. RULE 1.07(a); ABA DISCIPLNARY RULES No. 7-107(G).
10. Plaintiffs were a group of local lawyers and intervenors were several non-mem-
ber defense lawyers who sought to be appointed the proper representatives of the class.
11. E.g., compare Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310 (1959) (prior convic-
tions for similar offense released to newspaper); Strobel v. California, 343 U.S. 181
(1951) (suppressed confession released by prosecution); with In re Dellinger, 461 F.2d
389 (7th Cir. 1972) (defendants made comments on political aspects of the trial and
impartiality of the judge).
12. A statute is overbroad when it prohibits conduct in such a way as to "sweep
within its proscription conduct that is constitutionally protected." Dandridge v. Williams,
397 U.S. 471 (1970); See Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 249-50 (1967); N.A.A.C.P.
v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 432-33 (1963); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488-89
(1960).
13. 371 F. Supp. at 692.
14. Id. at 691, citing Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907).
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also to the government and, through it, to society. 15 They reviewed the his-
torical background which led to the adoption of the gag rules, 16 and then
dealt with -the plaintiffs' contentions separately in relation to criminal jury
trials,17 in relation to civil jury trials,' s and finally in relation to -the lack of
distinction between these and bench trials.19
The Chicago Council of Lawyers had first argued that the rules failed
to utilize traditional protective devices in lieu of partially silencing attor-
neys. 20 A rule which infringes fundamental personal rights cannot stand
where there are less burdensome alternatives available. 2 ' The court noted
that continuances, changes of venue, cautionary instructions and sequestra-
tion are not preventive, but designed merely to overcome the effects of
prejudicial publicity once it has occurred. Furthermore, these techniques,
themselves, jeopardize other of defendant's constitutional rights. Continu-
15. Id. citing Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 82 (1970); North Carolina v.
Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 721 n.18 (1969); United States v. Tijerina, 412 F.2d 661, 666
(10th Cir.), cert denied, 396 U.S. 990 (1969); State v. Kavanaugh, 52 N.J. 7, 243 A.2d
225, 231 (1968).
16. The court noted that the gag rule was a direct result of the mandate of the
Supreme Court in Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1961), wherein the Court had
declared:
The courts must take such steps by rule and regulation that will protect their
processes from prejudicial outside interferences. . . . Collaboration between
counsel and the press as to information affecting the fairness of a criminal trial
.is not only subject to regulation, but is highly censurable and worthy of disci-
plinary measures (emphasis added). 384 U.S.. 333, 363.
In Sheppard, the Court reversed the murder conviction of Dr. Sam Sheppard on the basis
that by the totality of circumstances the massive publicity, including nonevidentiary state-
ments about the defendant and his actions, prior to and during the trial had been so
pervasive that there was a probability that prejudice had resulted and the proceedings
were therefore deemed to inherently lack due process. Id. at 352. In so holding the
Court had said: "The trial court might well have proscribed extrajudicial statements by
any lawyer, party, witness, or court official which divulges prejudicial matter." Id. at
361. After this decision both the legal and the news community undertook extensive
studies on this fair trial-free speech/press issue. See, e.g., ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON
FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS, ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIM.
JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS (1968) (hereinafter cited
as the REARDON REPORT); COMMITTEE ON THE OPERATION OF THE JURY SYSTEM, JUDI-
CIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE OPERATION OF THE
JURY SYSTEM ON THE "FREE PRESS FAIR TRIAL" ISSUE (1968) (hereinafter cited as the
KAUFMAN REPORT); ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y., SPECIAL COMMIT-
TEE ON RADIO, TELEVISION, AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, FREEDOM OF THE
PRESS AND FAIR TRIAL, FINAL REPORT WITH RECOMMENDATIONS (1967) (hereinafter
cited as the MEDINA REPORT); AMERICAN NEWSPAPER PUBLISHERS ASSOCIATION SPECIAL
COMM. REPORT FREE PRESS AND FAIR TRIAL (1967); Barist, First Amendment and Reg-
ulation of Prejudicial Publicity, 36 FORDHAM L REV. 425 (1968); culminating in the
adoption of the currently challenged rules.
17. 371 F. Supp. at 692-96.
18. Id. at 697.
19. Id.
20. Id. Traditional protective devices include continuances, changes of venue, cau-
tionary instructions and sequestration. Id. at 692 n.5.
21. San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); Dunn v. Blum-
stein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); Kusper v. Pontikes, 94 S. Ct. 303 (1973).
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ances and changes of venue conflict with a defendant's right to a speedy trial
in the locale in which the crime took place, and in conjunction with caution-
ary instructions, they cannot negate the effect of prejudicial publicity once
it has permeated the proceedings. Sequestration may itself be prejudicial to
the defendant through the inconvenience and annoyance it causes jurors.
Since these remedial measures do not prevent the prejudice at its inception,
the court found the traditional techniques clearly inadequate.
2 2
While this reasoning is valid in terms of balancing the rights of a de-
fendant against overcoming the effects of defendant-prejudicial statements
made by the prosecution, it is not so clearly valid when the prejudice is
directed toward the prosecution, as it would be if made by a defense attor-
ney. It is unclear whether the state has a constitutional right to a speedy
trial, in the locale in which the crime has been committed. Furthermore,
since a jury is rarely informed why they are being sequestered, if, as the
court believes, their prejudice will be directed against the defendant, it can
certainly do no harm to the prosecutor to seek sequestration to guard against
defense-made prejudicial statements.
But the force of any distinction between the effect curative techniques
may have on differing rights of defendants and prosecutors may be some-
what diminished if, as seems only fair in a system of equal justice, those
rights are the same. By analogy the court seems to imply just that in an-
swer to plaintiffs' second contention, that the rules are overbroad in failing
to distinguish between comments favorable to the criminal defendant and
those which are hostile.2 3  The court noted -that incidents of prejudicial pub-
licity have generally been due to prosecutorial excesses. 24  But this does
not mean that statements made by defense counsels, though favorable to a
defendant, may not be prejudicial to the prosecution. 25 In fact the recent in-
crease in defense-characterized "political trials" would likely make such in-
cidents more common. Allowing such prejudicial material, even though only
prejudicial to the prosecution, to infect the courtroom is no more com-
mensurate with the ideal that conclusions should only be based on evidence
adduced in open court than allowing prosecutors to generate publicity preju-
dicial to the accused. As the court pointed out in answer to plaintiffs' sec-
ond contention: "The adoption of the one-sided approach urged by the plain-
tiffs would ignore the correlative interest of society in a fair trial. Any limi-
tation of prejudicial comment should apply to any attorney (prosecution or
defense) bent on securing improper advantage.
'26
22. 371 F. Supp. at 692.
23. Id.
24. REARDON REPORT, supra note 24 at 37, 42-43.
25. See MEDINA REPORT, supra note 16 at 43-55; REARDON REPORT, supra note 16
at 42-43, 175; Bloeth v. Denno, 313 F.2d 364, 378-79 (2nd Cir.) (dissent), cert. denied,
372 U.S. 978 (1963); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. at 361.
26. Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 371 F. Supp. 689, 692 (N.D. I11. 1974),
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Plaintiffs' third contention was that the gag rules constituted a prior re-
straint of first amendment rights and must be judged accordingly. 7 While
the Constitution guarantees the rights of free speech and press,2 8 these rights
have never been held to be absolute. There are instances where the first
amendment's ban on prior restraints may be over-ridden-"where disclosure
will surely result in direct, immediate and irreparable damage."' 29  Similarly,
there are certain kinds of speech which have generally not been considered to
be constitutionally protected. 30 In answer to plaintiffs' contention, the court
said that the gag rules were not a prior restraint because they did not impose
a blanket prohibition on all speech irrespective of content. Rather, they
sought only to punish speech from which prejudice was reasonably likely to
result. They impose a responsibility on those who violate them as do the
laws on slander, libel and obscenity.
3'
In so holding, the court distinguished Organization for a Better Austin
v. Keefe,3 2 where the Supreme Court ruled unconstitutional an injunction
prohibiting the organization from distributing leaflets which had attacked
Keefe's business practices. They held that injunction to be a prior restraint
because it operated "not to redress alleged private wrongs, but to suppress,
on the basis of previous publications, distribution of literature 'of any kind'
in a city of 1 8,000. '' 3  It seems likely, therefore, that the court in Chicago
Council of Lawyers did not mean that a rule which subjects one to disciplinary
action for speaking is not a prior restraint, rather that the gag rule was
sufficiently narrow to prohibit speech that, in itself, is not constitutionally
protected from being restrained.
Whether statements which are merely "reasonably likely" to interfere
with a fair trial or otherwise prejudice -the due administration of justice in-
cludes constitutionally protected speech was the issue raised by the plain-
,tiffs' fourth and final attack on -the breadth of the gag rules. The Chicago
Council of Lawyers had argued that the rules were overbroad because they
were not based upon a "clear and present danger" of prejudicial effect,
but rather on the lesser standard of "reasonable likelihood". 34 In support
citing State v. VanDuyne, 43 N.J. 369, 204 A.2d 41, cert. denied, 380 U.S. 987 (1969);
State v. Kavanaugh, 52 N.J. 7, 243 A.2d 225 (1968).
27. 371 F. Supp. at 693.
28. U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
29. N.Y. Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 730 (Stewert, J., concurring).
See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 523 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring);
Froewerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204, 206 (1919); Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S.
275, 281 (1897).
30. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1969) (libel and slander); Roth v. United
States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) (obscenity); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1969) (fight-
ing words); see generally Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
31. 371 F. Supp. at 693.
32. 402 U.S. 415 (1971).
33. ld. at 418-419.
34. 371 F. Supp. at 693,
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of this proposition the Chicago Council of Lawyers cited four cases in which
the United States Supreme Court reversed contempt convictions for state-
ments which allegedly showed disrespect to the judiciary and interfered with
the fair administration of justice.8 5 In each of those cases the Supreme
Court forbade punishment absent a showing that the utterances created a
clear and present danger to the administration of justice.3 6 But the court
in Chicago Council of Lawyers felt that these cases were not controlling.
The contempt cases were distinguished on three grounds: (1) the cases
and their use of the clear and present danger standard were said to apply only
-to the first amendment rights of the press and private citizens where no ju-
dicial proceeding is pending, not to lawyers participating in ongoing litiga-
tion ;37 (2) they were concerned with defining the permissible scope of the
contempt power, "a common law concept of the most general and undefined
nature," not with the violation of a narrowly drawn court rule which seeks to
accommodate competing constitutional interests ;38 and (3) they dealt with
hostile remarks directed at judges or the general administration of justice,
and not with remarks intended to influence a jury in a pending trial. 9
35. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S.
331 (1946); Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947); Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375
(1962).
36. 314 U.S. at 263, 271; 328 U.S. at 337, 348-50; 331 U.S. at 376, 378; 370 U.S.
at 384-85, 395.
37. 371 F. Supp. at 693. This seems to imply that lawyers participating in a trial
are different from the press or private citizens who may be concerned with the outcome
of the trial, and that this difference is substantial enough to warrant requiring the lawyer
to partially forego a significant and fundamental constitutional right.
38. ld. But the distinction is irrelevant. Constitutional interpretation is exclu-
sively a function of the judiciary. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803). In terms
of what standard the Constitution requires before speech can be punished, there is no
difference whether the standard is set by the Legislature or by case law. The court in
Bauer supports their distinction by pointing out that "the Supreme Court has made it
abundantly clear that review of contempt convictions will differ drastically from review
of statutory violations where the need for regulation has been buttressed by prior legis-
lative deliberations." Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 371 F. Supp. 689, 693
(N.D. Ill. 1974), quoting Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. at 260-61; Wood v. Georgia,
370 U.S. at 386. But there the Court was referring to review of the evidence as to the
source from which comes the danger that a Government body is entitled to protect
against, in this case prejudice, and not the standard of content which amounts to that
danger. Because of the possibility of judicial abuse of the "freehand of contempt" the
Court was concerned with what words interfered with the administration of justice so
as to justify contempt not the standard by which those words would be measured and
prevented.
39. To support this distinction, the court cited Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375
(1962) where the Supreme Court had said:
It is important to emphasize that this case does not represent a situation where
an individual is on trial . . . . Neither Bridges, Pennekamp nor Harney in-
volved a trial by jury . . . and of course the limitations on free speech assume
a different proportion when expression is directed toward a trial as compared
to a grand jury investigation. Id. at 389-90.
But there again the Court was talking about content-the actual words used and whether
they might influence a judge or a jury. They were not referring to effect-the standard
by which unspecific words are to be measured-in determining whether they are consti-
NOTES AND COMMENTS
The opinion then relies on the dissent in In re Sawyer,40 dealing with a
similar factual situation, to raise doubt as to the viability of the clear and
present danger standard as a measure of protected speech, 4' and a Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals decision in United States v. Tijerina,42 to hold that
such is not the required standard to be used in measuring the constitu-
tionality of court rules proscribing the dissemination of prejudicial remarks
by active trial counsel. 43  Having rejected the "clear and present danger"
standard, the court balanced the right of trial counsel to comment on pend-
ing criminal proceedings against the right of individual defendants and so-
ciety to a fair and impartial trial and found that the contexual interests in
free speech were "neither compelling nor evident. ' 44  The court noted that
the gag rules neither prohibit all speech nor impair the public's right to know.
They asserted that participating attorneys do not necessarily have a proper
interest in publicly discussing matters not of record that could affect the out-
come of the litigation, and pointed out that the Supreme Court has held that
the right to a fair trial takes precedence over other constitutional guaran-
tees.45 Logical practicality would indicate that the reasonable likelihood
tutionally protected. What specific words might constitute a clear and present danger
of prejudicing a judge or a jury relate to contempt, and is different from how general
words are to be measured to determine whether they fall within unprotected speech
which relates to effect. Furthermore, generally speaking it seems reasonable that any
statement a defense attorney might make that could be prejudiced would more than
likely be directed at a judge or the administration of justice, as in Bridges and its prog-
eny, than at the facts in evidence or of facts which could not be used as evidence. See
REARDoN REPORT, supra note 16 at 20-47, but see Bloeth v. Dueno, 313 F.2d 364 (2nd
Cir. 1963) (dissenting opinion).
40. 360 U.S. 622 (1959) where during the pendency of a criminal case one of the
trial counsel, Mrs. Sawyer, made a public speech construed by the Supreme Court of
Hawaii as an attack on the fairness and impartiality of the Federal District Court Judge
presiding over the trial. In a 5-4 decision, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed Mrs. Saw-
yer's conviction and suspension for gross misconduct on the grounds that the finding
upon which the suspension rested were not supported by the evidence. The majority
had judged the words not to create a clear and present danger of prejudice. id. at 662.
But the dissent emphasized that the First Amendment rights of active trial counsel were
significantly less immune from restrictions that those of others who were not officers
of the court hearing the case. Id. at 668 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). The dissent went
on to say: "Even in the absence of the 'substantial likelihood' that what was said at
a public gathering would reach the judge or jury, conduct of the kind found here cannot
be deemed to be protected by the Constitution." Id. at 622, 668 (emphasis added). It
might be well to point out that Frankfurter's use of the phrase "substantial likelihood"
referred to whether the words would be disseminated, not to whether the content of
the words were likely to be prejudicial.
41. 371 F. Supp. at 695.
42. 412 F.2d 661, cert. denied, 396 U.S. 990 (1969). The court upheld a contempt
conviction for violating an order prohibiting extra-judicial comments by all attorneys and
defendants despite defendants' assertion that the order was invalid since it was not based
upon a "clear and present danger" standard. The court said that a "reasonable likeli-
hood" standard sufficed. Id. at 666.
43. 371 F. Supp. at 696.
44. Id.
45. Id., citing Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 540-41 (1965). Contra, Thomas v.
Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 531 (1944); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 95-6 (1948) (Frank-
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standard is mandatory. The court said: "If convictions are to be overturned
on a showing that publicity probably affected the outcome, attempts by court
rule to forestall such prejudice must be judged by the same standard.
'46
Finding no merit to any of the four arguments of overbreadth in relation
to criminal jury trials the court extended the reasoning to include civil jury
and bench trials as well. Since "the very purpose of a court system is to
adjudicate controversies, both criminal and civil, in the calmness and sol-
emnity of the courtroom according to legal procedures, ' 4T and since extra-
judicial statements which may be prejudicial will be equally so whether di-
rected to a jury in a criminal or a civil case, many of the reasons which estab-
lish the constitutionality of the gag rules as applied to criminal jury trials also
support their constitutionality as applied to civil jury trials.48  Similarly,
judges like jurors, are only human, so that any effect of prejudice an extra-
judicial statement may have upon a jury could equally affect the attitude
of a judge in a bench trial.
49
LIMITS ON THE SCOPE OF FREE SPEECH
The decision of the court in Chicago Council of Lawyers turns on the
rejection of the "clear and present danger" test and the adoption of a bal-
ancing test to determine the constitutionality of these rules that infringe
on first amendment rights. The court's ultimate justification was that 'the
Supreme Court has never said that a clear and present danger to the right of
a fair trial must exist before a trial court can forbid extra judicial statements
about the trial."5 0  But it should be noted that the Supreme Court has
further, J., concurring); Barnes, A Changing Attitude Toward Trial by Newspaper, 16
OKLA. L. REV. 337 (1963), where it is said that "freedom of speech and press and the
right to an impartial trial are in reality co-extensive, and each necessary for the existence
of the other," such that the distinction between the two is artificial. Id. at 337-383;
United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967), where the Court noted that none of the
Bill of Rights provisions are more important or substantial than any other, each being
necessary to ensure a free society. Id. at 268 n.20; RIGHTs OF FAIR TRIAL ABA INFO.
MANUAL (1969) which points out that the "United States Supreme Court has refused to
assert the primacy of any part of the Bill of Rights over any other part, but instead has
consistently treated them as equal." Id. at 83.
46. Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 371 F. Supp. 689, 696-97 (N.D. Ill.
1974).
47. Id., quoting Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting).
48. 371 F. Supp. at 697.
49. Id., citing Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 565 (1965). Accord, Bridges v.
California, 314 U.S. 252, 299 (1941) (dissenting opinion). Contra, Craig v. Harney,
331 U.S. 367 (1947); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946); Bridges v. Califor-
nia, 314 U.S. 252 (1941). Certainly the different standards for jury and bench trials
applied for appellate reversals of convictions when prejudicial evidence has been ad-
mitted at trial support the idea that judges are more immune to prejudicial affects and
more likely to judge a case solely on proper evidence but the recent experiences in the
"Chicago 7 Conspiracy Trial", In re Dellinger, 461 F.2d 389 (7th Cir. 1972), is a clear
example that the modern view that "judges are only human" might be of greater validity.
50. Chicano Council of Lawyer v. Balier, 371 F. Supp. 689, 697 (N.D. Ill. 1974 ,
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also never said that a clear and present danger need not exist before a
court can take such action.51 Therefore, to effectively analyze the reason-
ing of the court, and its value, it is necessary to discuss the viability of the
"danger standard" and the alternative approaches the courts may use
when measuring the extent of the freedom of speech.
The fundamental issue involved in measuring the first amendment's
scope of freedom of speech is the determination of the point at which the
rights of the individual stop and the rights of organized society to protect
itself and its institutions begins. A democratic society requires that its people
be given the information necessary to make an intelligent evaluation of com-
peting ideas. Since first enunciated in Schenck v. United States,53 where
it was used as a rule of evidence to limit the time and place for exercise of
freedom of speech, not to limit content,5 4 the clear and present danger test is
the test the courts have used to measure when necessary information could
be supressed for the sake of a greater common good. The early applications
of the test were to determine the validity of restrictions on acts of pure
speech, but by 1947, the danger doctrine was expanded to include other re-
lated first amendment problems. 55 Subsequent resistence to this omnibus
use of the test56 culminated in its implied rejection in Dennis v. United
51. If they had, the court would not have had to use this inverse reasoning to justify
rejection of the standard. While the Supreme Court refused certiorari in United States
v. Tijerina, 412 F.2d 661 (2nd Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 990 (1969), this can-
not be meant to imply assent to what was said there.
52. Comment, Clear and Present Danger Standards: Its Present Viability, 6 U.
RicH. L. REv. 93 (1971).
53. 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
54. The Court said "We admit that in many places and in ordinary times the de-
fendants, in saying all that was said in the circular, would have been within their consti-
tutional rights. But the character of every act depends upon the circumstances in which
it is done." 249 U.S. 47, 52. The clear and present danger test was refined in Holmes'
dissent in Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919), to limit speech only where
the danger the speech provoked was imminent. Then in Brandeis' concurring opinion
in Witney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927), it was raised to a constitutional level as
a means to determine validity of statutory challenges to freedom of expression. The
majority of the Court finally accepted the test in Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242
(1937), where it was used to reverse a conviction for violating a Georgia statute making
it a crime to incite insurrection. The Court found the statute invalid as applied, feeling
that the defendant's conduct did not amount to a clear and present danger of bringing
about the substantive evil that the statute was designed to prevent. Id. at 263.
55. E.g., Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940) (picketing in labor disputes);
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (disturbing the peace by playing record
attacking the church); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945) (registration of labor
organizers); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (com-
pulsory flag salute for public school children). See U. RICH. L. REv., supra note 52
at 100 n.47.
56. See American Communications Assoc. v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1952), involv-
ing validity of a provision of the Taft-Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C. § 159(h) (1952) (repealed
1959) which denied services of the NLRB to any union official who refused to sign a
"no communist connections" affidavit, where Chief Justice Vinson expressed dissatisfac-
tion with any attempt to mechanically apply the test in every case involving First
Amendment freedoms. Instead he suggested that the Court adopt a new approach
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States.57 Chief Justice Vinson, joined 'by Justices Reed, Burton and Min-
ton, said that use of the danger test would prevent governmental action until
it was too late. 58 The opinion urged the adoption of a modified version of
the test: "In each case (the court) must ask whether the gravity of the evil,
discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is
necessary to avoid the danger." 59
The Court's desire to avoid the danger test becomes evident when it is
noted that between 1951 and 1971 the test was found specifically unsuitable
in dealing with free speech and libel6" or obseenity, 6 1 and was in fact used in
only one majority opinion.62 With these exceptions, the Court has replaced
the danger test with the logical extension of the modified version urged in
Dennis:6 3 a balancing approach, at first referred to as "ad hoc balancing"'64
whereby the conflicting interests are balanced. Id. at 394. Compare Terminiello v.
Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1947) with Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951). See gen-
erally U. RICH. L. REV., supra note 52 at 104-09; Strong, Fifty Years of Clear and Pres-
ent Danger, 1969 Sup. CT. REV. 31. See BERNs, FREEDOM VrRTuE AND THE FisT
AMENDMENT 72 (1967); Krislov, From Ginzburg to Ginsberg; The Unhurried Chil-
dren's Hour in Obscenity Litigation, 1968 Sup. CT. REV. 153, 178-79; McCloskey, Re-
flections on the Warren Court, 51 VA. L. REV. 1229, 1236 (1965).
57. 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
58. Overthrow of the Government by force and violence is certainly a substan-
tial enough interest for the Government to limit speech. Indeed, this is the
ultimate value of any society, for if a society cannot protect its very structure
from armed internal attack it must follow that no subordinate value can be pro-
tected. If then, this interest may be protected the literal problem which is pre-
sented is what has been meant by the use of the phrase 'clear and present dan-
ager' of the utterance bringing about the evil within the power of Congress to
punish. Obviously, the words cannot mean that before the Government may
act it must wait until the putsch is about to be executed, the plans have been
laid and the signal is awaited. . . . The damage which (attempted over-
throws) create both physically and politically to a nation makes it impossible
to measure the validity in terms of the probability of success, or the immediacy
of a successful attempt. . . . We must therefore reject the contention that suc-
cess or probability of success is the criterion. 341 U.S. at 509-10.
59., United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 212 (2nd Cir. 1950). It should be
noted that determining the point at which freedom of expression ceases to be constitu-
tionally protected through the probability or improbability of certain conduct occurring
is not the same as determining at which point that conduct imminently threatens the
existence of organized society. And once the gravity of the evil is discounted by the
probability one is still left with the need to balance to determine whether the invasion
is justified. Such a technique emasculates the danger test as a means of determining
a reference point for the scope of free speech. United States v. Dennis, 341 U.S. 494,
581-92 (1951) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
60. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952); see New York Times v. Sul-
livan, 376 US. 254 (1964).
61. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 486 (1957).
62. Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962), where the Court used the clear and
present danger test to reverse a contempt conviction for statements allegedly made to
interefere with the due administration of justice. Id. at 395.
63. Discounting the evil by its probable occurrence still requires a further step to
determine whether the gravity justifies the interference. This further step is a balancing
to determining the weight of the evil vis-a-vis the interference. See KRISLOV, THE SU-
PREME COURT AND POLMCAL FREEDOM, 121 (1968); KALVEN, THE NEGRO AND THE
Frst AMENDMENT, 86, 121 (Phoenix ed. 1966).
64. Ad hoc balancing is the technique whereby the interest in prohibiting the con-
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and more recently called "definitional balancing," 65 which is the approach
taken by the court in Chicago Council of Lawyers.
Many reasons have been put forth for the Court's abandonment of the
clear and present danger test.68 In Dennis, specifically, the socio-political
and economic complexity of the communist threat during the McCarthy era
made the test unsuitable when dealing with the conduct presented to the
Court.6 7 More generally, however, its mechanical application in a wide va-
riety of cases completely unrelated to situations envisioned by its authors
seems to have too severely restricted the latitude of approaches necessary
when dealing with various differing factual problems.68 Certainly a balanc-
ing technique seems more applicable when dealing with the multiple possibil-
ities raised by speech-related conduct or speech-plus.
ALTERNATIVES AVAILABLE TO THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
'Definitional balancing allows a court greater opportunity to ground its
decision on the specific factual circumstances involved in each case. It per-
mits a court to weigh the various interests supported by the specific con-
duct, and the effect upon those interests of a ruling on that conduct, in deter-
mining its result. But while balancing gives preference to the latitude of
the court's opinion, it is at the expense of creating uncertainty as to the
extent of the first amendment guarantee.
Reasonable Likelihood of Prejudice
The reasonable likelihood standard rests on such a balancing approach
and presupposes the desirability of the sixth amendment over the first in the
context of trial publicity.69 The reasonable likelihood standard has been
upheld in decisions by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
duct is weighed against the interest of the person in pursuing such conduct. See Morris
& Powe, Constitutional and Statutory Rights to Open Housing, 44 WASH. L. REV. 1, 28-
46 (1968); Kauper, Political Freedom, 58 MICH. L. REV. 619 (1960); Karst, Legislative
Facts in Constitutional Litigation, 1960 S. Cr. REv. 75; Karst, The First Amendment
and Harry Kalven, 13 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1 (1965).
65. Definitional balancing requires the court to define such concepts as speech,
abridge and freedom and to measure the extent to which the facts meet these definitions.
In light of this, the court then weighs the respective interests involved. See Emerson,
Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 912-16 (1963);
Frantz, The First Amendment in Balance, 71 YALE L.J. 1424, 1433-45 (1962); Nimmer,
The Right to Speak from "Times" to "Times": First Amendment Theory Applied to
Libel and Misapplied to Privacy, CALiF. L. REV. 935, 935-67 (1968).
66. See Corwin, Bowing Out 'Clear and Present Danger', 27 NoTRE DAME LAW.
325 (1952); Emerson, supra note 85; FREUNEL, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES (1961); Kalven, The Central Meaning of the First Amendment, 1964 S. CT.
REV. 191; KRiSLOV, THE SUPREME COURT AND POLrICAL FREEDOM (1968).
67. Comment, U. RicH. L. REV., supra note 52 at 102.
68. Id. at 102 and n.93.
69. See supra notes 53-57 and accompanying text.
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Circuit7 0 and by the appellate court of California. 71  The Second Circuit
decision relied on the Supreme Court's mandate in Sheppard v. Maxwell7 2
for rules to limit publicity, and on the belief that a fair trial takes preference
over free speech. 73 The California appellate court based its ruling on the be-
lief that the clear and present danger test requires a judge to "palm off
guesswork as finding" and 'puts a premium on hypocritical adherence to
an abstract formula."' 74 They found that reasonable likelihood was more
"honest" because the entire prejudicial publicity problem is one of "contin-
gencies rather than realities" and such a test permits the courts to consider
"openly and frankly the many future variants which collectively may
amount to a reasonable likelihood, but, by their very contingent nature, can
never amount to a clear and present danger." 75
This reasoning, and that of the district court in Chicago Council of
Lawyers, is itself speculative. Neither -the first nor sixth amendment guar-
antees can effectively exist without the complimentary mandate and result
of the other. A fair trial insures that the freedom to speak will not be arbi-
trarily taken away, and conversely free speech insures that a trial will be
open and fair. A preference for either constitutional guarantee jeopardizes
the other, and should at least depend on the social and political importance of
the speech as well as the degree and imminence of prejudice to a fair trial.
Furthermore, failure to specifically define the scope of protection of the first
amendment subjects the lawfulness of its exercise to the arbitrary views
of a particular court whose determination of probability of prejudice is a
finding of fact. Such a danger was impliedly recognized by the California
court when they said that "in the hands of a conscientious judge the 'reason-
able likelihood' test will not be abused."'76
Clear and Present Danger of Prejudice
A more definitive and strict approach to the scope of free speech limits
the potential for abuse of standards. If applied to problems strictly of
speech, and not speech-plus, such an approach will not restrict a court's lati-
70. United States v. Tijerina, 412 F.2d 661 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 990
(1969).
71. Busch v. Superior Court, 30 Cal. App. 3d 138, 106 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1973).
72. 384 U.S. 333 (1961); see supra, note 16.
73. United States v. Tijerina, 412 F.2d 661, 667 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
990 (1969). To support the preference of the 6th Amendment, over the 1st, the court
cites Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965), where plaintiff's conviction for fraud was
reversed because of the potential prejudice due to the publicity surrounding the case,
including the fact that the trial itself was televised. During the course of its opinion
the Supreme Court said: "We have always held that the atmosphere essential to the
preservation of a fair trial-the most fundamental of all freedoms-must be maintained
at all costs." Id. at 540 (emphasis added).




tude in a factual context. Despite the criticisms of commentators and those
noted above, the clear and present danger test may be useful where isolated
acts of individuals involving pure speech tend to threaten interests which
government is duty bound to protect. This strict approach to first amend-
ment problems has been applied where pure speech was sought to be sup-
pressed. As recently as 1969, the Supreme Court, without using the words
"clear and present danger", raised their spectre when, in Brandenburg v.
Ohio,77 the Court said: "The guarantees of free speech and free press do not
permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law
violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing
imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action."78
The Seventh Circuit has used these same words in holding unconstitu-
tional a court order imposing a blanket restriction on extra-judicial comments
by lawyers in a pending case.79 In In re Olivers0 the court, reversing a dis-
ciplinary judgment against a lawyer who had violated such an order, said:
"Before a trial court can limit defendants' and their attorneys' exercise of
first amendment rights of freedom of speech, the record must contain suffi-
cient specific findings by the trial court establishing -that defendants' and their
attorneys' conduct is a serious and imminent threat to the administration of
justice." 81 Oliver dealt with an order during the pendency of a civil jury trial,
and -the majority opinion noted that there was support for the "reasonable
likelihood" standard when dealing with criminal jury trials.8 2 But the court
in Chicago Council of Lawyers held the reasonable likelihood standard con-
stitutional in either civil or criminal trials.8 3
In Chase v. Robson84 the Seventh Circuit was confronted with a blan-
ket order restricting comment during a criminal trial, and specifically refused
to rule on whether the clear and present danger (serious and imminent
threat) or the reasonable likelihood standard was the required test.8 5 In
Chase, like Oliver, the order was overbroad because it failed to distinguish
between speech that would not have a prejudicial effect on the fair admin-
istration of justice and speech that would have such prejudicial effect.8
Therefore neither case can be cited as requiring either standard, and the ap-
pellate court need not be bound by their implied acceptance of the clear and
present danger standard.
77. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
78. Id. at 447.
79. In re Oliver, 452 F.2d 111 (7th Cir. 1971); Chase v. Robson, 435 F.2d 1059
(7th Cir. 1970).
80. 452 F.2d 111 (7th Cir. 1971).
81. Id. at 114, citing Chase v. Robson, 435 F.2d 1059, 1061 (7th Cir. 1970).
82. In re Oliver, 452 F.2d 111, 114 (7th Cir. 1971).
83. Supra note 49.
84. 435 F.2d 1059 (7th Cir. 1970).
85. Id. at 1062. They mentioned and applied both tests.
86. Id., citing Zwickler v, Koota, 389 U.S, 241 (1967) and U.S. v, Robel, 389 U.S,
2,8 (1967),
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Knowledge or Reckless Disregard of Prejudice
Even more strict than clear and present danger is an approach which
considers the first amendment absolute protection except where, by defini-
tion, the speech itself is an evil to be prevented. In dealing with pure
speech, the content of which might be beyond the protection of the Constitu-
tion because it is characterized as either libelous or obscene, the Supreme
Court has been reluctant to allow sanctions to be imposed where the speech
has serious "political value."87 As pointed out earlier, defense attorney
statements also may have serious political value as they are often statements
concerning the quality of police investigation and judicial conduct. Because
of the public's right and need to know, such a comment on a public institu-
tion rises to a different constitutional level than a comment intended solely
to influence a jury's determination of the facts of a case. In dealing with
restrictions on speech that is libelous, the Court has said that where com-
ment is about public figures and matters of public concern restrictions can
only be imposed where there is "knowledge or reckless disregard" of falsity.8 8
Since defense made statements are likewise often on matters of public con-
cern, by analogy perhaps, the test that should be applied would prohibit ex-
tra-judicial comment only where it is made with "knowledge of its prejudicial
effect or reckless disregard that such is bound to occur."
The "knowledge or reckless disregard" concept was enunciated in New
York Times v. Sullivan where the Court used it to limit the extent to which
state laws against defamation could be applied to media defamation. Its ap-
plicability to the gag rule situation rests on the similarities that both deal
with acts of pure speech on matters of public concern. But the Supreme
Court decision in Gertz v. Welch8 9 raises a caveat as to the applicability of
the Times standard to the gag rule situation. In a 5-4 decision, the Court
reversed a judgment against a noted defense attorney who alleged that he
had been libeled by a newspaper article about a trial in which he was en-
gaged. The Court refused to extend the Times standard to media defama-
tion of private persons merely because an issue of general or public concern
was involved. Rejecting an ad hoc balancing technique and applying a defi-
nitional balancing approach, the Court said that to make such an extension
would abridge to an unacceptable degree the legitimate state interest in com-
pensating private individuals for injury to reputation and would occasion the
87. In the obscenity cases the Court has refused to permit literature to be sup-
pressed, and considered obscene, when it has "serious literary, artistic, political or scien-
tific value." Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). In the media defamation
cases the Court has noted that the social and political importance of comment on mat-
ters of public concern is so strong as to require a special showing of "malice" before
a judgment for libel can be rendered against the published. New York Times v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254, 279-83 (1964).
88. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-83 (1964).
89. Gertz v. Welch, 94 S. Ct. 2997 (1974).
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difficulty of forcing the court to decide on an "ad hoc" basis which publica-
tions address issues of public interest.90 While the "knowledge or reckless
disregard of danger" test is applicable to pure speech on matters of public
concern, it may not be applicable where the content of the speech is directed
toward private personalities. But although police investigaters may be pri-
vate persons, prosecutors and judges are elected or appointed officials and
any comment on their actions may fall within the Times-type protection.
CONCLUSION
In reviewing the decision in Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, the
Seventh Circuit will have to address itself to the constitutionality of the "rea-
sonable likelihood" standard. The problem of media pervasiveness and its
effects -upon the right to a fair trial is substantial, and necessitates some ac-
commodation between the first and sixth amendment guaranteeg. A lawyer
engaged in ongoing litigation is an advocate, but he is also an officer of the
court and responsible for the efficacy of its processes. These factors weighed
heavily in the reasoning of the district court.
If the appellate court agrees with those conclusions which led to the up-
holding of the gag rules the problem of prejudicial publicity may be solved.
But the potential viability of the first amendment will be severely threat-
ened. To prohibit speech merely because it is reasonably likely to bring
about an evil is to prohibit all but innocuous speech. 91 A society that sup-
presses thought whenever that thought is reasonably likely to be effective will
eventually stagnate because of its own fear of change. Over-ruling the de-
cision in Chicago Council of Lawyers by adopting the "clear and present dan-
ger" or "knowledge of evil" test would not have this result. If either the
"danger" or the "knowledge" test is used, they will prevent comment which
would interfere with the due administration of justice as well as the present
gag rule test does: a statement which would prejudice the outcome of a
case would fall within any of the above restrictions. But the use of either of
these other two tests would have the further effect of less drastically limiting
the rights of free speech. The desirable result could be accomplished with-
out the undesirable interference with the scope of the first amendment.
-STEPHEN B. ENGELMAN
90. Id. at 3004.
91. See United States v. Dennis, 341 U.S. 494, 581-92 (1951) (Douglas, J., dissent-
ing).
